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IN RE DRISCOLL: ILLINOIS' NEW APPROACH
IN THE DISCIPLINE OF ALCOHOLIC
ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT
The Illinois Supreme Court's fundamental objective in attorney disciplinary
decisions is to ensure that persons authorized to practice law within its
jurisdiction are competent to act as officers of the court., Traditionally, the
supreme court has held that specific acts demonstrating unfitness, such as
conversion of clients' funds2 or neglect of legal matters,3 were grounds for
prohibiting an attorney's practice of law through suspension," disbarment,5 or
1. See, e.g., In re Andros, 64 Ill. 2d 419, 423, 356 N.E.2d 513, 514 (1976) (proper inquiry
in disciplinary action is whether attorney's conduct demonstrates unfitness to practice law).
Because attorneys are officers of the court and the Illinois Supreme Court is responsible for
supervision of the activities of courts within its jurisdiction, the Illinois Supreme Court has the
sole authority to discipline attorney misconduct. See In re Wyatt, 53 111. 2d 44, 45, 289 N.E.2d
630, 630-31 (1972) (ultimate responsibility for disciplining Illinois attorneys rests with Illinois
Supreme Court); People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 I11. 462, 470, 176 N.E. 901,
905 (1931) (Illinois Supreme Court has inherent power to regulate practice of law); In re Day,
181 Ill. 73, 96-97, 54 N.E. 646, 653 (1899) (Illinois Constitution grants supreme court jurisdic-
tion to regulate practice of law).
2. See, e.g., In re Smith, 75 III. 2d 134, 387 N.E.2d 316 (1979) (attorney disbarred for
forging clients' signatures on settlement check, depositing proceeds in attorney's own bank ac-
count, and spending proceeds for his own purposes).
3. See, e.g., In re Levinson, 71 111. 2d 486, 376 N.E.2d 998 (1978) (attorney suspended for
six months and until further court order for failure to advise client of status of case and failure
to do more than file petition for adoption on behalf of client). Generally, conduct which
violates a provision of the Illinois Supreme Court's Code of Professional Responsibility is
grounds for discipline. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I 10A, § 771 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981). Misconduct
that involves behavior not expressly enumerated in the Illinois Code can still be grounds for
discipline on the basis that the attorney misconduct tends to defeat the administration of
justice or brings the legal profession and the judicial system into disrepute. Id. See, e.g., In re
Andros, 64 Il1. 2d 419, 356 N.E.2d 513 (1976) (conviction of willful failure to file income tax
grounds for discipline); In re Sherre, 63 Ill. 2d 398, 356 N.E.2d 62 (1976) (conviction of mail
fraud grounds for discipline).
4. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, § 771 (c)-(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981). An attorney may
be suspended for a specified period of time, or until further order of the court, or for a
specific period of time and until further order of the court. Id. An attorney suspended for a
specified period of time is automatically reinstated when the period expires. An attorney
suspended until further order of the court must petition the court for reinstatement. An at-
torney suspended for a period of time and until further order may not petition for reinstate-
ment until the specified period of time has elapsed. Id. § 767. Further order of the court then
affords the court the ultimate discretion as to when the attorney may return to active practice.
5. Id. § 771(a), (b). An attorney may be disbarred by order of the court or on the volun-
tary consent of the attorney. Id. An attorney disbarred by court order may not petition for
reinstatement to practice law until five years after the date of the order of disbarment. Id.
§ 767. An attorney disbarred on consent may not petition for reinstatement until three years
after the date of the court order permitting disbarment on consent. Id. The traditional
response for unfitness demonstrated by drug or alcohol addiction or mental illness, absent
specific acts of misconduct, has been to transfer the attorney to inactive status. This may be
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censure. By imposing discipline, the Illinois Supreme Court has attempted to
protect the public and to safeguard the bar from reproach. 7 In determining
the appropriate sanction the court has also considered the severe hardship
that can result from disbarment or suspension and has attempted to prescribe
a moderate sanction that was fundamentally fair to the attorney.'
In those cases where misconduct may have been caused by the attorney's
alcoholism, the Illinois Supreme Court has consistently prescribed the tradi-
tional forms of discipline.9 Recently, however, the Illinois Supreme Court in
In re Driscoll" recognized that it may be more beneficial to encourage the
rehabilitation of alcoholic attorneys rather than to prohibit their practice of
law. The Driscoll court fashioned a new form of discipline, supervised pro-
bation, to promote Driscoll's continued recovery from alcoholism.' ' In ad-
dition, the court unanimously concluded that Driscoll's misconduct war-
ranted a less severe degree of discipline than that normally prescribed for
the same wrongful acts.'"
done either voluntarily by the attorney or by court order. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, §§ 757,
758, 770 (1979). Once the attorney has been reinstated to active status, any disciplinary action
against the attorney may be resumed. Id. § 759.
6. Id. § 771(f). Censure involves public notification of an attorney's wrong doing. It is
often imposed for minor instances of attorney misconduct. See, e.g., In re Kutner, 78 Ill. 2d
157, 399 N.E.2d 963 (1980) (charging excessive fee warranted censure).
7. See, e.g., In re Leonard, 64 11. 2d 398, 406, 356 N.E.2d 62, 66 (1976) (purpose of
discipline is to protect public and maintain integrity of bench and bar).
8. See, e.g., In re Damisch, 38 Ill. 2d 195, 208-09, 230 N.E.2d 254, 261-62 (1967)
(judiciary must impose discipline that protects public while at the same time ensuring fun-
damental justice for attorney); In re Fisher, 15 Ill. 2d 139, 154-55, 153 N.E.2d 832, 840-41
(1958) (disbarment and suspension cause severe hardship and should be prescribed only where
such punishment is fully warranted). The supreme court has taken into consideration
mitigating and aggravating factors to determine the appropriate discipline for wrongdoing.
Mitigating factors reduce the degree of discipline imposed and include circumstances such as
restitution to the client, personal or family difficulties, or absence of prior misconduct. See,
e.g., In re Chapman, 69 Il1. 2d 494, 372 N.E.2d 675 (1978) (personal and family problems); In
re Costigan, 63 Ill. 2d 230, 347 N.E.2d 129 (1976) (restitution); In re Sherman, 60 111. 2d 590,
328 N.E.2d 553 (1975) (lack of prior misconduct). Aggravating factors, such as false testimony
at a disciplinary proceeding or failure to respond to a complaint, increase the degree of
discipline imposed. See, e.g., In re Stillo, 68 Il. 2d 49, 368 N.E.2d 897 (1977) (false
testimony); In re Simpson, 47 Il. 2d 562, 268 N.E.2d 20 (1971) (failure to respond to client's
calls and letters).
9. See In re Maley, 363 I1. 149, 1 N.E.2d 495 (1936) (attorney's neglect of legal matters
caused by inebriation in court warranted six-month suspension); People v. Tracey, 314 Ill. 434,
145 N.E. 665 (1924) (attorney's conversion of clients' funds during active alcoholism warranted
disbarment).
10. 85 111. 2d 312, 423 N.E.2d 873 (1981).
I1. Id. at 317, 423 N.E.2d at 875.
12. The supreme court held that Driscoll's conversion of clients' funds, during a period
when his behavior was impaired by alcoholism, warranted only a six-month suspension from
the practice of law. Id. at 312, 423 N.E.2d at 875. Conversion is viewed as an act of moral tur-
pitude which, absent mitigating factors, warrants disbarment. See, In re Smith, 63 11. 2d 250,
347 N.E.2d 133 (1976).
1982] IN RE DRISCOLL
A brief survey of alcoholism and its relationship to Illinois attorney
disciplinary law is necessary to fully comprehend the Driscoll decision.
Subsequent analysis of the court's decision reveals that supervised probation
is likely to accomplish the supreme court's competing goals of protecting
the public from unfit attorneys and safeguarding the bar's reputation
without imposing an excessive degree of discipline. One aspect of the
Driscoll court's reasoning, however, which indicates that in some cases
alcoholism may serve as a complete defense to attorney misconduct, may
lead to disciplinary decisions that will fail to protect the public and the in-
tegrity of the legal profession. To remedy this defect in the court's analysis,
it is suggested that a comprehensive framework for the discipline of
alcoholic attorney misconduct be developed.
ALCOHOLISM AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
A well-reasoned approach to the discipline of alcoholic attorney miscon-
duct must be grounded on a firm understanding of alcoholism itself.
Alcoholism is generally defined as an intermittent or continual ingestion of
alcohol that has led to dependency or harm.' 3 Although it is well recognized
that alcoholism can be controlled, it cannot be "cured."' 4 It is accepted,
however, that a recovering alcoholic'" can return to a useful, productive
position within society.' 6
13. Davies, Is Alcoholism Really a Disease?, 3 CONT. DRUG PROB. 197, 207 (1974).
Alcoholism is currently one of the leading public health problems. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, ALCOHOL AND HEALTH at v (1981). Approximately 10% of the American
population are alcoholics. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH. EDUC. & WELFARE, THE ALCOHOL, DRUG
ABUSE, AND MENTAL HEALTH NATIONAL DATA BOOK 15 (1980). It has been estimated that this
percentage is probably closer to 15% for the legal profession. Lavine, Liquor & Lawyers, 1981
N.Y. ST. B.J. 289, 290 [hereinafter cited as Lavinel. A consultant to the State of California
Committee on Alcohol Abuse has estimated that 50-60% of disciplinary problems are alcohol
related. Id. The chairman of the New York State Bar Association's Special Committee on
Alcoholism and Drug; Abuse has estimated that approximately 80% of disciplinary problems
are related to alcohol abuse. Id.
14. D. ARMOR, .1. POLICH & H. STAMBUL, ALCOHOLISM AND TREATMENT 35 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as ALCOHOLISM AND TREATMENT].
15. Because alcoholism cannot be cured, the alcoholic maintains that title regardless of
whether he or she is successfully recovering from alcoholism. This Note therefore uses the term
"recovering" alcoholic to designate someone who is successfully controlling the addiction and
the term "active" alcoholic to designate someone who is not.
16. A.M.A., MANUAL ON ALCOHOLISM 7-8 (3d ed. 1977). Many now classify alcoholism as
an illness. In fact, the American Medical Association officially recognized it as a disease in
1956. See A.M.A., Proceedings of the House of Delegates, Report of Reference Comm. on
Med. Educ. & Hospitals, 163 J.A.M.A. 33 (1957). By 1967, it had been recognized as a disease
by the World Health Organization, the American Hospital Association, and the American
Psychiatric Association. See S. REP. No. 93-208, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3039, 3042.
In addition, members of the legal profession have begun to take an active part in the
rehabilitation of alcoholic attorneys by establishing treatment programs. Many of these pro-
grams are privately organized by state or local bar associations. In Illinois, for example, the
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Recovery is usually accomplished in three stages. The initial step is the in-
dividual's recognition that he or she is an alcoholic and a desire by that in-
dividual to overcome the condition.'" Next, the individual must obtain
whatever medical treatment is required to eliminate physical addiction to
alcohol.' 8 Finally, it is vital for the individual to participate in group pro-
grams with other recovering alcoholics to aid in the recovery from his or
her psychological dependence on alcohol use.' 9
At one time, society made no effort to promote rehabilitation from
alcoholism because the condition was considered sinful and a sign of moral
weakness.2" Alcoholic attorneys were looked down upon by society and
were viewed as an insult to the legal profession.2 ' Although Illinois case law
in this area is limited, it appears that the Illinois Supreme Court had taken
a position analogous to the "sinful" view of alcoholism.22 Prior to Driscoll,
the court had refused to allow alcoholism to mitigate the degree of attorney
discipline imposed. 3 The supreme court usually imposed the same sanction
for misconduct caused by alcoholism as it did for misconduct unrelated to
alcoholism." Because the court's analysis had consistently placed heavier
Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois State Bar Association jointly established the Lawyers'
Assistance Program, Inc. (LAP). The purpose of this organization is to intervene before the at-
torney's alcoholism leads to disciplinary problems. LAP maintains a policy of confidentiality
and is not affiliated with the state disciplinary commission. Lavine, supra note 13, at 311-12.
17. J. ROYCE, ALCOHOL PROBLEMS AND ALCOHOLISM 99 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ROYCE].
The individual must recognize the difficulties that alcohol addiction has caused, including
marital and family discord, and occupational troubles. Id. This realization leads the active
alcoholic to conclude that the benefits and costs of sobriety are greater than those of inebria-
tion. See generally Reed, The Price of Sobriety, 2 J. DRUG ISSUES 313 (1973).
18. Ottenberg, Detoxification in a Comprehensive Alcoholism Treatment Program,
reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PROCEEDINGS: SEMINAR ON ALCOHOLIC
EMERGENCY CARE SERVICES, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES PUB. No. 73-9024 (1972).
19. ROYCE, supra note 17, at 247-49. These meetings also aid the recovering alcoholic in
overcoming feelings of self-pity, guilt, helplessness, and confusion. Id. Many organizations for
recovering alcoholics including Alcoholics Anonymous, maintain that the recovering alcoholic
must completely abstain from the consumption of alcohol to maintain rehabilitation from
alcoholism. ALCOHOLISM AND TREATMENT, supra note 14, at 35.
20. See Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. Rav. 1045, 1054-61
(1944) (alcoholism once viewed as a wilful and culpable condition caused by moral weakness or
dissolute immorality).
21. See Lavine, supra note 13, at 290-91 (problem of attorney alcoholism long ignored,
because alcoholism was viewed as something immoral); Middleton, Help, Hope for the
Alcoholic Lawyer, 1981 BAR LEADER 29, 30 [hereinafter cited as Middleton] (alcoholic at-
torneys once considered outcasts from profession).
22. See In re Maley, 363 Ill. 149, 1 N.E.2d 495 (1936) (alcoholic attorney's neglect war-
ranted six-month suspension); People v. Tracey, 314 Ill. 434, 145 N.E. 665 (1924) (alcoholic at-
torney's conversion warranted disbarment).
23. See People v. Tracey, 314 Ill. 434, 145 N.E. 665 (1924) (alcoholism no mitigation for
conversion of clients' funds). In one case, habitual drunkenness alone was sufficient grounds
for a six-month suspension because such conduct caused inadequate representation of a client
at trial and "interfered with the orderly progress of litigation." In re Maley, 363 Ill. 149, 152,
1 N.E.2d 495, 497 (1936).
24. Compare In re Maley, 363 Ill. 149, 1 N.E.2d 495 (1936) (alcoholic attorney's neglect
warranted six-month suspension) and People v. Tracey, 314 11. 434, 145 N.E. 665 (1924)
(alcoholic attorney's conversion warranted disbarment) with In re Smith, 75 Ill. 2d 134, 387
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emphasis on sheltering the public from the unfit attorney, rather than on
the plight of the alcoholic attorney, 5 the discipline imposed had effectively
outcast the alcoholic attorney from the legal profession. Essentially, the Il-
linois Supreme Court had failed to achieve its goal of prescribing a
moderate degree of discipline to the attorney that was fundamentally fair.
If the alcoholic attorney was later reinstated to active legal practice, he or
she resumed practice without supervision. "6 Because the Illinois Supreme
Court designed no mechanism to guard against a possible relapse to active
alcoholism, it failed to protect the public from the attorney's potential in-
competency. Recognizing these deficiencies, the Driscoll court fashioned a
new approach for the discipline of alcoholic attorney misconduct.
THE DRISCOLL DECISION
James Driscoll's unprofessional conduct came to the attention of the At-
torney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) 27 after one of his
clients filed a complaint alleging that Driscoll had not accounted for the
client's settlement proceeds. 2 The ARDC's investigation revealed that
Driscoll had converted clients' funds on two occasions in late 1977.29 The
first occurred when Driscoll endorsed his client's settlement check and
deposited it into his personal bank account. Subsequently, Driscoll
withdrew money from the account thereby causing the balance in the ac-
count to fall below the amount owed to his client.3 0 After repeated demands
N.E.2d 316 (1979) (non-alcoholic attorney's conversion warranted disbarment) and In re Chap-
man, 69 Ill. 2d 494, 372 N.E.2d 675 (1978) (non-alcoholic attorney's neglect of three appeals
warranted three-mont'h suspension).
25. In People v. Tracey, 314 Ill. 434, 145 N.E. 665 (1924), for example, the court stated:
Habitual drunkenness, and inability to pay through lack of means as a result of
such habitual intoxication, cannot be recognized by this court as a sufficient excuse
or cause for an attorney to escape the condemnation and punishment required [for
conversion of clients' funds]. . . . Drunkenness is no excuse for the non-
performance or malperformance of any legal services by an attorney for a client,
and should such conduct become so habitual and continuous as to endanger clients
in securing their legal rights, it will be sufficient ground for disbarment.
Id. at 436-37, 145 N.E. at 666.
26. See In re McDonnell, 82 Ill. 2d 481, 413 N.E.2d 375 (1980) (recovering alcoholic at-
torney reinstated to active practice without supervision or probation). The Rules of the Illinois
Supreme Court do not presently provide for supervision or probation following an attorney's
readmission to the practice of law.
27. The Illinois Supreme Court has delegated to the ARDC the authority to investigate and
prosecute an attorney's alleged unethical conduct and to recommend discipline for misconduct.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10A, §§ 751-53 (1979). For a detailed analysis of the rules creating the
ARDC, see Swett, Illinois Attorney Discipline, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 325 (1977).
28. 85 Ill. 2d 312, 313, 423 N.E.2d 873, 873.
29. Id. Conversion is usually proved by evidence that the attorney deposited funds belong-
ing to the client into one of the attorney's personal bank accounts and that the attorney subse-
quently allowed the balance in this account to fall below the amount due the client. See, e.g.,
In re Stillo, 68 Ill. 2d 49, 368 N.E.2d 897 (1977).
30. 85 11. 2d at 313, 423 N.E.2d at 873. Driscoll had been retained to represent two
children in a dram shop action against a tavern owner whose place of business had been the
location of the death of the children's father. The court awarded damages to the children and
1982]
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from the client, Driscoll's wife, with the full knowledge and consent of her
husband,3' made restitution by withdrawing funds from his business ac-
count, wherein Driscoll had deposited the settlement proceeds from a case
with a different client." This payment caused the balance in his business ac-
count to fall below the amount due to the second client." In short, Driscoll
had committed a second conversion in order to make restitution to his first
client. 14
At the disciplinary hearing," Driscoll admitted that he committed the two
acts of conversion, but explained that both acts had occurred while he was
an active alcoholic. 3 In an effort to minimize any disciplinary action that
might be imposed, he presented evidence of his recovery from alcoholism3"
and of his continued participation in Alcoholics Anonymous.3 Despite this
evidence, the Hearing Board focused on the nature of Driscoll's misconduct
and recommended his disbarment.3 9 It concluded that his active alcoholism
constituted neither a mitigating factor nor a complete defense to his conver-
ordered that the settlement proceeds be placed in a trust account. Driscoll obtained the settle-
ment check, forged the signature of his co-counsel, and in violation of the court order,
deposited the check in one of his bank accounts. Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
of the Hearing Board, at 1-2, In re Driscoll, 85 Ill. 2d 312, 423 N.E.2d 873 (1981).
31. 85 Il1. 2d at 313, 423 N.E.2d at 873.
32. Id. Driscoll had been retained by the second client to institute a personal injury claim.
The claim was later settled out of court. After the client endorsed the settlement check,
Driscoll endorsed it himself and deposited it in his own business account. Findings, Conclu-
sions, and Recommendations of Hearing Board, at 2, In re Driscoll, 85 I11. 2d 312, 423 N.E.2d
873 (1981).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 313, 423 N.E.2d at 873. Restitution was made to the second client some time
after the client filed his complaint with the ARDC. Id.
35. The Hearing Board of the ARDC conducts hearings and makes findings of fact and
conclusions of law on complaints regarding alleged unethical conduct. Based on these findings
and conclusions, the Hearing Board recommends to the Review Board the degree of discipline
it deems appropriate, the dismissal of the complaint, or the transfer of the attorney to inactive
status. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, § 753(c) (1979).
36. 85 111. 2d at 313-14, 423 N.E.2d at 873. Driscoll presented evidence that during his ac-
tive alcoholism
[h]is personal appearance disintegrated, his weight dropped, he ate little, and his
fingernails were falling out; he could not remember where he had been or what he
had done; he stayed out every night and had no family or social life; he did not
return clients' calls and took no new clients. Nothing mattered to him except a
drink.
Id.
37. Id. Driscoll introduced evidence that he voluntarily entered Lutheran General Hospital
in August 1978, where he began receiving medical and psychiatric treatment for his alcohol
problem. Id.
38. Id. Driscoll testified that he had begun participating in Alcoholics Anonymous while at
Lutheran General Hospital and was still active in the program. He further testified that he had
abstained from alcohol use since entering Lutheran General. The doctor in charge of the
alcoholism treatment program at Lutheran General Hospital testified that Driscoll was perfectly
fit medically. Id. at 313-14, 423 N.E.2d at 873-74.
39. Id. at 314, 423 N.E.2d at 874.
IN RE DRISCOLL
sion of clients' funds.4 0  Because the Hearing Board recommended
discipline, the action proceeded to the Review Board.
4
Before the Review Board Driscoll argued that his alcoholism should be a
mitigating factor and, as such, disbarment constituted too severe a
sanction. 2 After examining the findings and recommendations of the Hear-
ing Board, the Review Board recommended Driscoll's suspension for thirty
months and until further court order."3 The Board noted that alcoholism
should be considered a mitigating factor in the discipline imposed because
"alcoholism is a disease and not a condition for which the individual
should be held responsible."' Following the Review Board's recommenda-
tion of disciplinary action, the case proceeded to the Illinois Supreme Court
for final determination."
Before Illinois' highest court, Driscoll contended that his alcoholism
should be viewed as a complete defense to his misconduct." He further
claimed that even if some disciplinary action was instituted, probation was
the proper sanction because he was now sufficiently rehabilitated to practice
law competently.' 7 The supreme court disagreed with Driscoll's contention
that his alcoholism was a complete defense to the misconduct involved.'8
40. Id. The Hearing Board stated that
alcoholism, no matter how severe, cannot constitute a defense to the breach of an
attorney's duties that occurred here. We are not dealing with matters of neglect,
but with two positive acts of moral turpitude and fraudulent behavior involving the
funds of clients held in trust by the attorney.... Whatever disability [Driscoll's]
drinking habits may have imposed upon him, it is ... clear that it did not ... in-
terfere with his handling of the clients' claims until it came time to disburse to
them the funds that were rightfully theirs.
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations of the Hearing Board, at 6, In re Driscoll, 85
Ill. 2d 312, 423 N.E.2d 873 (1981).
41. The Hearing Board's reports are scrutinized by the Review Board when action by the
supreme court has been recommended or in other cases when the Administrator has filed ex-
ceptions to the Hearing Board's report. The Review Board may approve, reject, or modify the
findings or recommendations of the Hearing Board. It may also remand the proceeding for
further action or dismiss the proceeding. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1IOA, § 753(c) (1979).
42. 85 Ill. 2d at 314, 423 N.E.2d at 873.
43. The Review Board determined that the Hearing Board's recommendation of disbarment
was excessive. Report and Recommendation of the Review Board, at 1, In re Driscoll, 85 Ill.
2d 312, 423 N.E.2d 873 (1981). Two members of the Review Board filed a separate report
recommending Driscoll's suspension for one year on the condition that he continue rehabilita-
tion. •85 Ill. 2d at 314, 423 N.E.2d at 874.
44. Report and Recommendation of the Review Board, at 4, In re Driscoll, 85 111. 2d 312,
423 N.E.2d 873 (1981). The Board noted that this concept is "almost universally recognized."
Id. The Board further recommended that "a program be developed for an alcoholic lawyer to
permit his resumption of the practice of law after a period of supervision during which his ac-
tivities are monitored and his progress to regain self-control measured." Id. at 5.
45. Reports and recommendations of the Hearing Board and the Review Board are merely
advisory. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10A, § 753(c) (1979).
46. 85 II1. 2d at 314, 423 N.E.2d at 874.
47. Id. at 314-15, 423 N.E.2d at 874.
48. Id. at 316-17, 423 N.E.2d at 874. It should be noted, however, that the court recogniz-
ed the possibility of alcoholism as a complete defense in rare cases. See infra notes 78-81 and
accompanying text.
1982] 439
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Instead, it accepted the Review Board's recommendation that his alcoholism
was a mitigating factor4 9 and, thus, concluded that a six-month suspension
from the practice of law was appropriate. 0 The court agreed, however,
with Driscoll's claim that probation was appropriate and imposed an in-
definite period of supervision during and after his suspension."
In reaching this result, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that this case did
not present the rehabilitation of an active alcoholic because Driscoll was
well on the road to recovery. 2 The court stated, however, that where an at-
torney remains an active alcoholic, it would likely impose disbarment or
suspension until further order. 3 Because Driscoll had established his sub-
stantial rehabilitation from alcoholism, the supreme court concluded that
disbarment or suspension until further order was inappropriate for his mis-
conduct. 54
In addition, the court noted that it has not hesitated to disbar an im-
paired attorney where the attorney has not shown that the impairment
substantially contributed to his wrongdoing. Moreover, the supreme court
observed that disbarment also has been imposed where the impaired at-
torney did not demonstrate that rehabilitation rendered him competent to
practice law. 6 The court surmised, however, that Driscoll's situation did
not fall into either of these categories. Rather, it observed that active
alcoholism had substantially caused Driscoll's misconduct 7 and recognized
that as a result of his successful efforts to recover from alcoholism he was
now fit to practice law. 8 The supreme court also concluded that Driscoll's
fitness would be presumed as long as his recovery from alcoholism was en-
sured. 9 In view of Driscoll's successful rehabilitation, the Illinois Supreme
49. Id.
50. Id. at 317, 423 N.E.2d at 875.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 315, 423 N.E.2d at 874. The court pointed out that given the opportunity it
would attempt to induce the active alcoholic's recovery. Id.
53. Id. The court's rationale for pursuing a stricter form of discipline when an active
alcoholic is involved is that extra caution must be taken in order to protect the public from an
active alcoholic attorney's unfitness to practice law. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. In support, the supreme court cited In re Smith, 63 111. 2d 250, 347 N.E.2d 133
(1976). In Smith, the attorney contended that his emotional, financial, and drinking problems
contributed to his conversion of client's funds. Although the Illinois Supreme Court responded
that these circumstances were unfortunate, they afforded no excuse, and therefore, the court
ordered disbarment. Id. at 254, 347 N.E.2d at 135.
56. 85 I11. 2d at 315, 423 N.E.2d at 874 (citing In Re Patlak, 368 Il. 547, 15 N.E.2d 309
(1938)).
57. 85 I11. 2d at 315-16, 423 N.E.2d at 874. The supreme court observed that Driscoll's
"judgment and will were undermined by alcoholism; he cared only for drink, and neglected all
other concerns, at great cost to himself." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 316, 423 N.E.2d at 874. The supreme court stated that "[wihen someone who
has apparently led an otherwise blameless life is guilty of professional misconduct while crippled
by a chemical addiction, we are willing to assume that the misconduct, like his other short-
comings, was dependent on his craving and will not be repeated once that craving is subdued."
Id. at 315-16, 423 N.E.2d at 874.
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Court concluded that disbarment was not warranted.
Nevertheless, the supreme court determined that alcoholism could not
constitute a complete defense to the two counts of conversion.6" It reasoned
that although alcoholism might render an attorney incapable of exercising
judgment in rare circumstances," Driscoll's alcoholism did not have such a
devastating effect. Driscoll had competently handled his clients' cases until
the time came to disburse their settlement proceeds.6" Consequently, the
supreme court concluded that Driscoll should be disciplined for the two acts
of conversion.6
3
In determining the appropriate degree of discipline, the Illinois Supreme
Court recognized that a prolonged period of suspension might adversely af-
fect Driscoll's recovery.6 4 The court reasoned that a six-month suspension
from the practice of law would be sufficient punishment. 65 Moreover, to en-
courage Driscoll's continued recovery, the court prescribed an indefinite
period of probation during which he would be required to report his pro-
gress to the ARDC. 6 6 According to the Driscoll court, suspension and
supervised probation would best discipline Driscoll's wrongdoing because it
would encourage his recovery, protect the public from incompetency, and
safeguard the legal profession from reproach. 67
DRISCOLL: THE APPROPRIATE RESULT
The Illinois Supreme Court's imposition of suspension and supervised
probation for Driscoll's conversion of clients' funds during his active
alcoholism demonstrates the court's recognition of alcoholism as an impor-
60. Id. at 316, 423 N.E.2d at 874. The court stated that although Driscoll was now present-
ly fit to practice law, his past conduct was unacceptable to the legal profession under any con-
ditions and required some degree of punishment. The court further noted that "Inlot all
alcoholics appropriate the money of their clients; the slide from drink to dishonor may be
smooth, but it is neither automatic nor uncontrollable." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 316, 423 N.E.2d at 875.
63. Id. at 316-17, 423 N.E.2d at 875. The court reasoned that Driscoll had not been "en-
tirely an innocent victim of forces beyond his control." Id. at 316, 423 N.E.2d at 875.
64. Id. at 317, 423 N.E.2d at 875. The supreme court observed that the hardship and
depression which could result from prolonged suspension could induce Driscoll's return to ac-
tive alcoholism. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The supreme court suggested that the rehabilitation program could be Alcoholics
Anonymous, the Lawyers' Assistance Program, or a similar program acceptable to the ARDC.
The supreme court reserved the right to take further action if Driscoll relapsed to active
alcoholism or engaged in other activities demonstrating his unfitness to practice law. Id.
The court also remarked that after further experience with alcoholic attorneys it may revise
its present rules, which do not provide for supervised probation. The court contended,
however, that it has the inherent authority to impose this new form of discipline prior to
modification of its rules. Id. at 318, 423 N.E.2d at 875.
67. Id. The supreme court emphasized: "[wie would like to see [Driscoll] restored to an ac-
tive practice and a position of esteem in his profession. We must also protect the integrity and
reputation of that profession, and protect the public. Pending further experience with alcoholic
attorneys, we are trying our best to manage both." Id.
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tant consideration in the Illinois disciplinary law. The sanction imposed in
Driscoll indicates that the supreme court will make every reasonable effort
to aid an alcoholic attorney's return to a useful, productive position within
the legal profession and within society. This result benefits all con-
cerned-the disciplined attorney, the bar, and the public-and represents
significant progress in the discipline of alcoholic attorney misconduct.
In keeping with its aim of imposing fair and moderate sanctions, the
supreme court's sanction in Driscoll was fundamentally fair." The court
recognized Driscoll's alcoholism, not as an indication of his moral
weakness, but rather as a physical and mental impairment that substantially
hampered his ability to practice law competently." ' Additionally, the court's
decision to reduce the period of suspension from thirty months to six mon-
ths rewarded Driscoll's efforts to recover from his disability."0 The Illinois
Supreme Court's requirement that Driscoll participate in Alcoholics
Anonymous or the Lawyers' Assistance Program also encouraged his con-
tinued successful rehabilitation." Accomplishment of this goal was ensured
by permitting the ARDC to call upon other members of the legal profession
to directly supervise Driscoll's progress." The overall effect of the court's
68. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
69. 85 111. 2d at 315, 423 N.E.2d at 873-74. For example, the supreme court noted that
Driscoll's alcoholism had led him to a self-destructive course of behavior, where he cared for
nothing but a drink. Id.
70. The supreme court specifically reduced the length of suspension to encourage Driscoll's
continued rehabilitation. Id. at 317, 423 N.E.2d at 875. For a case consistent with Driscoll in
another jurisdiction, see Tenner v. State Bar of California, 28 Cal. 3d 202, 617 P.2d 486, 168
Cal. Rptr. 333 (1980). In Tenner, the Supreme Court of California considered the appropriate
discipline for an attorney's conversion of clients' funds and neglect of their legal matters dur-
ing a period of active alcoholism. Subsequent to the misconduct, the attorney had made
substantial progress in recovering from his alcoholism. The court determined that the proper
discipline was a stay of a two-year suspension, and the imposition of supervised probation with
strict conditions attached. If these conditions were not met, the two-year suspension would be
imposed. The California Supreme Court reasoned that this approach would be sufficient to
protect the public and the profession while inducing the alcoholic attorney's continued
recovery. Id. at 206-09, 617 P.2d at 487-89, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 334-36.
71. 85 11. 2d at 317, 423 N.E.2d at 875. The Minnesota Supreme Court has taken a similar
position in its discipline of alcoholic attorney misconduct. For example, in In re Johnson, 298
N.W.2d 462 (Minn. 1980) (per curiam) the supreme court imposed prolonged suspension
followed by supervised probation for an attorney's conviction of theft arising from the at-
torney's involvement in a scheme to divert funds belonging to his employer. The attorney
engaged in these activities during a period of active alcoholism, and had since begun recovery.
The court stated that requiring the attorney's participation in an acceptable alcoholic treatment
program, which was a condition to the attorney's suspension and to his supervised probation
upon readmission, would adequately encourage the attorney's continued recovery from
alcoholism. Id. at 463-64.
72. 85 Ill. 2d at 317, 423 N.E.2d at 875. The Illinois Supreme Court's decision allowed the
ARDC to call upon the Lawyer's Assistance Program (LAP) for assistance, if it desired. Id.
This flexible, cooperative approach allows both organizations to pursue their separate goals
and permits LAP to maintain its policy of confidentiality. See generally Lavine, supra note 13,
at 311-12 (cooperation between private bar groups and state disciplinary bodies allows both to
pursue particular interests to the fullest).
Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar approach. For example, the imposition of super-
vised probation following the recovering alcoholic attorney's return to active practice has been
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rehabilitation measures was to provide Driscoll with a moderate sanction
specifically tailored to aid in his recovery and return to a competent legal
practice.
The Driscoll court arrived at this moderate sanction without forsaking its
duty to protect the public from unfit attorneys or compromising the reputa-
tion of the legal profession. The court's requirement of rehabilitation to
justify the prescription of a reduced degree of discipline ensures that those
returning to the practice of law will be competent to act as officers of the
court.' 3 Further, the supreme court's imposition of supervised probation
provides a mechanism for guarding against relapse to active alcoholism. 4
The court's sanction also demonstrates that attorneys will be held to a
demanding standard of ethics and will not be exonerated from a wrong-
doing.7" In the court's view, disbarment or suspension is likely to be imposed
instituted as a standard practice in both California and Minnesota in recent years. In 1977, the
State Bar of California instituted a pilot alcohol abuse program, whereby alcoholic attorneys
are supervised by members of the State Bar to ensure the attorney's compliance with the condi-
tions of his or her probation. Tenner v. State Bar of California, 28 Cal. 3d 202, 617 P.2d 486,
168 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1980). In Tenner, the California Supreme Court designated the State Bar
as Tenner's probation officer during his probationary period. It has been estimated that out of
76,000 persons licensed to practice law in California, 1,500 have taken advantage of this pro-
gram. Of these 1,500, approximately 65% have remained sober following termination of super-
vised probation. Telephone interview with Russell Longaway, Counsel, State Bar of California
(November 18, 1981).
Minnesota utilizes a similar procedure to that in California, but without the aid of a state
bar association. Instead, the Minnesota Supreme Court has delegated to the Director of its
Professional Responsibility Board the authority to designate particular attorneys from Lawyers
Concerned for Lawyers (LCL), a private organization, who must directly supervise the
disciplined attorneys to ensure their compliance with the terms of probation. In re Nurnberger,
Stipulation, File No. 48931, In re Nurnberger, 272 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 1978) exemplifies this
approach. In Nurnberger, two attorneys from LCL agreed in writing to supervise the recover-
ing alcoholic's progress and to report to the Director of the Professional Responsibility Board
periodically regarding the attorney's compliance with the conditions of probation, Id.
73. 85 11I. 2d at 317, 423 N.E.2d at 874. For an analysis in accordance with this view see In
re Walker, 254 N.W.2d 452 (S.D. 1977). In Walker, the court stayed suspension of an attorney
for conviction of criminal conduct, noting that his misconduct had occurred while he was an
active alcoholic. Pointing out that the attorney had begun successful rehabilitation two and
one-half years prior to the court's review, the court stated:
The respondent did not receive the consideration that we have given him today
because he is an admitted alcoholic but rather because he is, in our view, a bona
fide recovered . . . alcoholic who has for the past two and one-half years
demonstrated his fitness to continue in the practice of law.
Id. at 457.
74. 85 III. 2d at 31.7, 423 N.E.2d at 875. Cf. In re Lewelling, 244 Or. 282, 417 P.2d 1019
(1966). In Lewelling, the Supreme Court of Oregon disciplined an attorney for neglect of
clients' legal matters during active alcoholism by staying suspension and placing the attorney
on probation during his continued recovery from alcoholism. The court reasoned that since the
attorney had already begun rehabilitation, probation would be an "adequate measure to pro-
tect the public against a recurrence of the harm" which had been caused by the attorney's
alcoholism. Id. at 283, 417 P.2d at 1020.
75. For example, the Driscoll court emphasized that conversion is theft "of the most ag-
gravating sort, .. .[unlacceptable to the bar under any circumstances" 85 I11. 2d at 316, 423
N.E.2d at 874.
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where an attorney has not yet sought treatment for alcoholism or where
rehabilitation has failed to restore the attorney to a position of fitness.7 6
Accordingly, incompetent attorneys will be prohibited from practicing law.
By encouraging Driscoll's return to a productive position within the legal
profession, the Illinois Supreme Court implicitly recognized the value of his
legal skills, knowledge, and experience. In aiding Driscoll's return to "an
active practice and a position of esteem in his profession,", rather than
ostracizing him from the community, both society and Driscoll benefited.
CRITICISM OF THE DRISCOLL COURT'S ANALYSIS
Although the Illinois Supreme Court's sanction and supporting rationale
are primarily sound, a closer scrutiny reveals that the decision may actually
impede achievement of the goals of attorney disciplinary actions. Specifical-
ly, the court's assertion that, in some cases, alcoholism may constitute a
complete defense to a charge of misconduct78 is counterpoised to protecting
the public from unfit attorneys and preserving the reputation of the bar.
A successful assertion of alcoholism as a complete defense to the at-
torney's misconduct would produce an anomaly in that no discipline would
be imposed on an attorney who committed a wrong. If the court recognizes
alcoholism as a complete defense to attorney misconduct, it would be
unable to prohibit the attorney from practicing law pending rehabilitation.
Moreover, the court would be unable to impose supervised probation to
guard against relapse. These results would leave the public defenseless
against attorney incompetency and would severely undermine the bar's
reputation for fitness. 9
The supreme court justified its recognition of alcoholism as a complete
defense on the ground that alcoholism may in some instances render an in-
dividual so incapable of exercising judgment that the individual should be
exculpated for a wrongdoing. 0 The logical implication of this assertion is
that an attorney's misconduct may go undisciplined as the attorney's active
76. Id. at 315, 423 N.E.2d at 874. Cf. Comm. on Prof. Ethics v. Bergren, 300 N.W.2d 85
(Iowa 1980). In Bergren, the court confronted the issue of the appropriate discipline of an ac-
tive alcoholic attorney's failure to successfully begin recovery and consequent neglect of clients'
legal matters. The court determined that suspension for one year and until the attorney
recovered was required to prohibit the attorney's practice of law during his period of in-
competence. Id. at 87.
77. 85 Ill. 2d at 318, 423 N.E.2d at 875.
78. Id. at 316, 423 N.E.2d at 874. In its analysis, the Driscoll court stated that "in rare
cases alcoholism might so change the character of the misconduct or so distort the attorney's
state of mind as to provide a complete excuse." Id.
79. In fact, failure to impose a sanction may serve to inhibit rather than promote the active
alcoholic's recovery. It has been generally recognized that allowing the active alcoholic to
refuse to assume responsibility for the results of alcoholism usually prolongs the individual's
active alcoholism. See The Not So Silent Killer, 14 ARIZ. B.J. 5, 8 (1978) (alcoholic attorney
admitted that those who permitted him to escape consequences of alcoholism inhibited his
seeking treatment); Lavine, supra note 13, at 311 (covering up for active alcoholic attorney's
incompetence unwittingly contributes to attorney's deterioration).
80. 85 Ill. 2d at 316, 423 N.E.2d at 874.
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alcoholism becomes more severe and debilitating. Thus, the more incompe-
tent the alcoholic attorney, the more likely it is that he or she will be allow-
ed to continue the practice of law.
The logical extension of the court's approach also may lead to disturbing
consequences in other areas. For example, the Driscoll court's rationale
could apply with equal persuasion to an attorney's alleged narcotics use,
emotional aberrations, or occasional memory lapses. If these claims are
recognized as complete defenses to a wrongful act, incompetent and poten-
tially dishonest attorneys will not be disciplined and will continue to prac-
tice law.
In short, application of the Driscoll court's complete defense assertion
could serve to undermine the dual goals of protecting the public from unfit
attorneys and safeguarding the bar's reputation. To avoid this result, the Il-
linois Supreme Court should establish explicit rules' that would allow
alcoholism to serve as a mitigating factor in appropriate circumstances, but
would not allow it to be considered a complete defense.
A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The Illinois Supreme Court should codify Driscoll's treatment of
alcoholism as a mitigating factor and expressly delineate what role this fac-
tor will assume in attorney disciplinary decisions. Initially, the court should
define the terms 'active alcoholism" and "recovering alcoholism." This
would facilitate the application of alcoholism as a mitigating factor or as an
aggravating factor in determining the appropriate degree of discipline. Active
alcoholism should be defined as sufficient proof that dependence on alcohol
so seriously impairs the attorney's ability to practice law competently that
the attorney's conduct has violated the Illinois Code of Professional
Responsibility. 2 Recovering alcoholism, on the other hand, should be ar-
ticulated as sufficient proof of rehabilition from alcoholism such that the
attorney is competent to practice law in accordance with the Illinois Code
of Professional Responsibility. 3
81. The Illinois Supreme Court's adoption in 1981 of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, ILL. REV. STA r. ch. l10A, § 771 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981), exemplifies the court's
desire to provide more explicit guidelines for the discipline of attorney misconduct. The court's
adoption of rules whiclh specifically set forth the procedure for the discipline of alcoholic at-
torney misconduct would simply be another step in this process. The option is also available to
the court to clarify this area on a case-by-case basis. Such an approach might prove unsatisfac-
tory, however, because in the interim it would fail to provide explicit guidelines to hearing and
review boards and attorneys subject to discipline.
82. Cf. Comm. on Prof. Ethics v. Bergren, 300 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 1980) (active alcoholism
leading to wrongdoing supported a finding of unfitness to practice law); In re Stearns, 309
Minn. 548, 243 N.W.2d 312 (1976) (active alcoholism contributing to misconduct evidenced in-
competency to practice law).
83. Cf. Tenner v. State Bar of California, 28 Cal. 3d 202, 207, 617 P.2d 486, 488, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 333, 335 (1980) (alcoholic attorney's rehabilitation demonstrated fitness to practice law);
In re Walker, 254 N.W.2d 452, 457 (S.D. 1977) (alcoholic attorney's two-year abstention from
alcohol and participation in treatment programs signified competency).
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In addition, the supreme court's rules should provide that an attorney's
active alcoholism at the time of misconduct may be considered an ag-
gravating factor in determining the appropriate degree of discipline where
the attorney has not subsequently been rehabilitated. 4 The rules also should
set forth that an attorney's active alcoholism at the time of misconduct,
where the attorney has subsequently been rehabilitated, may be considered a
mitigating factor to a charge of misconduct."5 Further, the rules should
stipulate that an attorney's petition for reinstatement will be granted when
rehabilitation from alcoholism has been established by clear and convincing
evidence."
A rule requiring an alcoholic attorney's abstinence from alcohol and par-
ticipation in a rehabilitation program acceptable to the disciplined attorney
and to the ARDC should also be adopted. This requirement should be im-
posed upon the period of suspension and the period of supervised proba-
tion." Direct supervision of the attorney's progress would be accomplished
by a recovering alcoholic and an attorney suitable to both the disciplined at-
torney and to the ARDC.1 This team would be responsible for making
84. Cf. Comm. on Prof. Ethics v. Bergren, 300 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Iowa 1980) (attorney's
relapse into active alcoholism warranted additional discipline). In re Kumbera, 91 Wash. 2d
401, 405, 588 P.2d 1167, 1170 (1979) (conduct resistant to efforts at rehabilitation is aggravating
factor in determining requisite discipline).
85. Cf. Tenner v. State Bar of California, 28 Cal. 3d 202, 207, 617 P.2d 486, 488, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 333, 335 (1980) (recovering alcoholic attorney's strenuous rehabilitative efforts con-
sidered in mitigation); In re Nurnberger, 272 N.W.2d 914, 914 (Minn. 1978) (recovering
alcoholic attorney's successful efforts to rehabilitate considered in mitigation); In re Walker,
254 N.W.2d 452, 457 (S.D. 1977) (recovering alcoholic attorney's successful recovery con-
sidered grounds for lesser degree of discipline); In re Kumbera, 91 Wash. 2d 401, 405, 588
P.2d 1167, 1170 (1979) (recovering alcoholic attorney's voluntary, successful efforts to
rehabilitate considered in mitigation). Thus, in a future disciplinary action where the recovering
alcoholic attorney's misconduct is not as egregious as was Driscoll's, the Illinois Supreme
Court could reasonably conclude that supervised probation without a period of suspension would
be appropriate.
86. Cf. In re McDonnell, 82 11. 2d 481, 413 N.E.2d 375 (1980) (recovery from alcoholism
favorably considered in granting petition for reinstatement).
87. Cf. Tenner v. State Bar of California, 28 Cal. 3d 202, 208, 617 P.2d 486, 489, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 333, 335 (1980) (recovering alcoholic attorney's probation conditioned on participation in
alcohol abuse program); In re Johnson, 298 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Minn. 1980) (per curiam)
(recovering alcoholic attorney's suspension and probation conditioned on attorney's participa-
tion in acceptable treatment program).
88. For example, Rule 15 of the Minnesota Supreme Court provides that the court may
"place [an attorney] on a probationary status for a stated period, or until further order of
[the] court, with such conditions as [the] court may specify and to be supervised by the Direc-
tor [of the Lawyers Professional Board]." Minn. Sup. Ct. R. on Lawyers Prof. Resp. 15,
MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 52 (West 1977). See In re Johnson, 298 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Minn. 1980)
(per curiam) (alcoholic attorney's suspension and probation conditioned on participation in
alcohol treatment program and abstinence from alcohol).
89. The ARDC and the disciplined alcoholic attorney could choose an individual associated
with LAP, Alcoholics Anonymous, or some other private treatment group. In addition, these
parties could enter into agreements which specifically designate the duties and responsibilities
of the supervising team. See, e.g., In re Nurnberger, Stipulation, File No. 48931, In re Nurn-
berger, 272 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 1978). Supervision by another recovering alcoholic would aid
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periodic reports to the ARDC regarding the disciplined attorney's
progress.' 0 In the event that the attorney relapsed to active alcoholism, ad-
ditional discipline would be warranted. 9
The Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of these suggested rules would
highlight Driscoll's positive impact and avoid its flawed assertion that
alcoholism is a complete defense to acts of attorney misconduct. Addi-
tionally, the proposed rules would ensure that the public is served by fit at-
torneys, would protect the bar's reputation for competency, and would en-
courage rehabilitation from alcoholism.
CONCLUSION
In In re Driscoll, the Illinois Supreme Court confronted the issue of
disciplining an alcoholic attorney's conversion of his clients' funds in a way
that would protect the public and the integrity of the bar, yet encourage the
attorney's continued recovery from alcoholism. The court's imposition of
suspension and supervised probation should achieve these goals. The
supreme court also rejected its previous stance that alcoholic attorneys
should be expelled from the legal profession and in so doing made signifi-
cant progress in the discipline of alcoholic attorney misconduct.
Although the Driscoll court's decision is primarily sound, its reasoning
that alcoholism may constitute a complete defense under other cir-
cumstances is a proper subject of criticism. The application of this assertion
may preclude the supreme court's suspension and supervised probation of
alcoholic attorneys in future disciplinary cases and may fail to shelter the
public from unfit attorneys or maintain the integrity of the legal profession.
To remedy this deficiency in the Driscoll decision, it is urged that the Il-
linois Supreme Court develop a comprehensive procedure that would allow
recovering alcoholism to be considered as a mitigation factor and would re-
quire supervised probation during a recovering alcoholic attorney's practice
of law. These suggested procedures provide sufficient guidelines to ensure
that alcoholic attorney misconduct is disciplined in a manner that is fun-
damentally fair to the alcoholic, yet at the same time protects the public
from unfit attorneys and safeguards the bar's reputation for competency.
Susan E. Morehouse
in ensuring that the supervised attorney had not relapsed into active alcoholism. Supervision by
another attorney would also ensure that the supervised attorney was performing legal duties in
accordance with the Code. Middleton, supra note 21, at 30.
90. Cf. In re Flannery, No. 80-20 BD (Mass. Nov. 5, 1980) (supervisors responsible for
periodic reports to Bar Counsel regarding alcoholic attorney's progress); In re Nurnberger,
Stipulation, File No. 48931, In re Nurnberger, 272 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 1978) (supervisors
responsible for reporting to Director of Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board).
91. Cf. In re Lewelling, 244 Or. 282, 284, 417 P.2d 1019, 1020 (1966) (recovering alcoholic
attorney's relapse into active alcoholism or misconduct would be grounds for imposition of addi-
tional discipline); In re Walker, 254 N.W.2d 452, 457 (S.D. 1977) (future relapse would be
grounds for additional suspension).
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